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 “No One Shall Be Held in Slavery or Servitude”:
A Critical Analysis of International Slavery
Agreements and Concepts of Slavery1
Kevin Bales and Peter T. Robbins
Most historians of slavery do not know how lucky they are. The majority of
scholars concerned with slavery focus on the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, the legal slave trade of the period, and its aftermath. For these scholars,
the historical period can be clearly demarcated by the legislative moments
when the slave trade or slavery itself was abolished within states or empires.
The scholar of contemporary slavery enjoys no such clarity. Slavery as a social
and economic relationship has never ceased to exist during recorded history,
but the form that it takes and its definition have evolved and changed. Not
surprisingly, legal definitions have often failed to keep up with this evolution.
At present a renewed interest in slavery is highlighting the discrepancy and
confusion of the many definitions of slavery that are used by international
bodies, national governments, and scholars.
This paper traces the development of slavery definitions in international
agreements from 1815 to the present to show how the concept of slavery has
become increasingly confused. Through this process, we aim to generate a
more dynamic and universal definition of contemporary slavery from theo-
retical models and substantive examples. We also interrogate practices de-
fined as slavery in relationship to our definition in order to separate slavery
from other, similar human rights abuses, in the expectation that a clearer defi-
nition of contemporary slavery will allow for more effective study and legisla-
tion against it.
Overview of Slavery Definitions in International Law2
Freedom from slavery has been defined in international law as a funda-
mental human right. In spite of this, however, and in spite of the fact that
slavery has been subject to some of the strongest sanctions of the interna-
tional community, none of the more than 300 laws and agreements written
since 1815 to combat it has been totally effective.
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Early abolitionists in the late eighteenth century took as their first goal not
the abolition of slavery as an institution, but the ending of the international
slave trade. The 1815 Declaration3  Relative to the Universal Abolition of the
Slave Trade4  (the “1815 Declaration”) was the first international instrument5
to condemn it, and one of the abolitionist movement’s first clear achievements.
The early attempts to redress slavery established duties to prohibit, prevent,
prosecute, and punish anyone participating in the slave trade. The goal was to
eliminate slavery by imposing an obligation on each state to make it a crime.
In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars a large number of agreements were
made, both multilaterally and bilaterally, containing provisions prohibiting sla-
very and the slave trade in times of war and peace.
With the establishment of the League of Nations in the aftermath of World
War I, international attention focused on the elimination of slavery and sla-
very-related practices under the League’s leadership,6  though quarrels among
the colonial powers often slowed its efforts. The League’s work on the elimi-
nation of all forms of slavery helped to convince the world that the rights of
individuals constituted a legitimate part of international law. Until that time,
international law mostly dealt with the relationships between sovereign na-
tions.
The UN took over the League’s role after World War II, and slavery was
firmly established as a violation of basic internationally recognized human
rights. Early work of the UN included updating slavery conventions made by
the League of Nations. It is now a well-established principle that the “prohibi-
tion against slavery and slavery related practices have achieved the level of
customary international law and have attained ‘jus cogens’ status.”7
Customary international law is the general practice of states, which over
time becomes binding law. The Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) identifies  “international custom as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law.”8  Jus cogens rules are the highest norms of international law and
function as very strong rules of customary international law, somewhat similar
to an international constitutional law.9  The International Law Commission in a
report to the General Assembly of the United Nations acknowledged that the
“prohibition against slavery is one of the oldest and best settled rules of Jus Cogens.”10
The right not to be enslaved is an absolute right recognized and upheld by inter-
national law, and no state can derogate from its obligations in this regard. The
Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 24 likewise confirmed
that  “A state may not reserve the right to engage in slavery, to torture, to subject
people to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.”11
The practice of slavery has therefore been universally accepted as a crime
against humanity. Furthermore, freedom from enslavement is considered a
basic and fundamental human right, so  “that all nations have standing to bring
offending states before the Court of Justice.”12  Slavery, slave-related practices,
and forced labor13  in international law constitute:
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“(a) a ‘war-crime’ when committed by a belligerent against the nationals of another
belligerent
  (b) a ‘crime against humanity’ when committed by public officials against any per-
son irrespective of circumstances and diversity of nationality
  (c) a common international crime when committed by public officials or private
persons against any person.”14
Furthermore, the International Court of Justice ruled that protection from
slavery is one of two examples of  “obligations erga omnes arising out of human
rights law.”15  These erga omnes obligations are owed by a state to the interna-
tional community as a whole. It has been clearly and categorically established
that slavery is an international criminal offense irrespective of whether a gov-
ernment has ratified the relevant agreements.
Historical Analysis of the Evolution of Slavery
Definitions in International Agreements
The definition of slavery has been controversial since the beginning of the
abolition process, and the international community’s inability to clarify a defi-
nition has not helped in working towards the eradication of slavery. The pro-
cess of defining slavery has caused controversy in two ways: first, there are
arguments about which practices should be categorized as slavery and thus
designated for elimination, and secondly, because definitions have often
been accompanied by obligations on states to carry out particular actions,
there has been confusion about how to best accomplish the eradication of
different forms of slavery.  This last question has been especially problem-
atic since the relevant conventions have treated slavery as an institution
that can be outlawed, but its actual eradication requires social and economic
remedies in addition to legal ones.
If any part of the United Nations or other international body is going to be
effective in addressing slavery, it would be helpful to develop an international
consensus on what practices constitute slavery. If slavery is defined in a way
that includes phenomena across the breadth of social injustice or human
rights violations, its meaning becomes diluted and useless, leading to a
diffusion of the work against slavery and causing the resources dedicated
to eliminating slavery to be spread thinly across many areas, some of which
may be less clearly linked to the core types of human bondage. Slavery as
defined in the international instruments must, therefore, be reviewed in an
effort to identify and clarify the categories of practices included within its cur-
rent definition.
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Slavery Convention of 1926: A First Definition of Slavery
The first definition of slavery that appears in an international agreement is
the Slavery, Forced Labor and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention16
of 1926 (the “Slavery Convention of 1926”) agreed upon by the League of
Nations.17  This convention was adopted on the basis of recommendations made
by the Temporary Slavery Commission established by the League of Nations
in 1922. Article 1(1) sets out the definition of slavery as “the status or condition
of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of own-
ership are exercised.”18  The Slavery Convention of 1926 prohibits all aspects of
the slave trade, defined as “includ[ing] all acts involved in the capture, acquisi-
tion or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts in-
volved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him;
all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being
sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves.”19
While Article 1 of the Slavery Convention of 1926 may appear relatively
restrictive in its definition of slavery, Article 2 requires states20  “To bring about,
progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all
its forms.”21  Recognizing that one of these forms was closely linked to the
forced labor practices which were common under colonial administrations in
the 1920s (in the Belgian Congo, for example, indigenous populations were
forced to work in the production of cash crops such as rubber, with extreme
cruelty, torture, the loss of all personal freedom, and the enforcement of the
work requirements through violence characterizing their “forced labor”), the
Slavery Convention specified that “forced labor may only be exacted for public
purposes” and required states “to prevent compulsory or forced labor from
developing into conditions analogous to slavery”.22
The various forms of slavery had been officially listed and partially defined
in a work prepared by the Temporary Slavery Commission in 1924. It was sub-
sequently approved by the Council of the League of Nations, which, in addi-
tion to enslavement, slave raiding, the slave trade, and slave dealing, included:
“1. (c) Slavery or serfdom23  (domestic or predial);
  2. Practices restrictive of the liberty of the person, or tending to acquire control of
the person in conditions analogous to slavery, as for example:
(a) Acquisition of girls by purchase disguised as payment of dowry, it being
 understood that this does not refer to normal marriage customs;
(b) Adoption of children, of either sex, with a view to their virtual enslave-
ment, or the ultimate disposal of their persons;
(c) All forms of pledging or reducing to servitude24  of persons for debt or
other reason....
  4. System of compulsory labor, public or private, paid or unpaid”.25
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It should be noted that these are essentially pragmatic definitions based on
examples of existing practices rather than an attempt to find the common at-
tributes of the different manifestations of slavery as a relationship. Much of
the subsequent confusion concerning what is and what is not slavery springs
from this separation of the practical and the conceptual. Seeking to reflect the
realities of current criminal activity, political interest, and public concern, the
League set out definitions designed for legal enforcement, but did so through
a process of negotiation and compromise. The diplomats engaged in this pro-
cess were also mindful of national interests. The result is a definition highly
reflective of its historical context, listing examples of slavery designed by dip-
lomats for legal enforcement. As that definition has been adopted by scholars
and activists, and applied to changing forms of slavery, it has failed to provide
necessary analytical clarity.
The references to “any or all of the powers of ownership” and “abolition of
slavery in all its forms” in the first two articles of the Slavery Convention had
the effect of covering not only domestic slavery but also the other forms of
slavery referred to in the Report of the Temporary Slavery Commission.26  The
same League of Nations Assembly resolution which approved the Slavery
Convention confirmed the League’s interest “in securing the progressive abo-
lition of slavery and conditions analogous thereto,” establishing the founda-
tions for international interest in “conditions analogous” to slavery, and
commented on forced labor, suggesting “it should not be resorted to unless it
is impossible to obtain voluntary labor.”27  This in turn set the scene for con-
sideration of forced labor by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and
the adoption of a convention on forced or compulsory labor in 1930—four
years later.
While the Slavery Convention outlawed slavery and associated practices, it
did not establish procedures for determining the existence of slavery in the
countries signing the convention, nor did it create an international body that
could evaluate and pursue allegations of violations. Despite these omissions,
the League, through international pressure and publicity, did convince gov-
ernments such as Burma (1928) and Nepal (1926)28  to abolish slavery within
their borders. It should be noted that in some countries, as in Burma, these
laws actually compensated the slave-owners for their loss while making no
provision for restitution to the freed slaves. From 1931 the League established
committees of experts to consider information about slavery, but the work of
the second of these, the Advisory Committee of Experts on Slavery, was ended
by the outbreak of World War II.
In the 1920s and 1930s there was increased public concern in Europe and
North America about the issue of “white slavery,” and a series of international
conventions was adopted concerning the traffic of women for prostitution.
These abuses were not mentioned in the 1926 Slavery Convention or dealt
with by the various committees of experts on slavery, although the first of the
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international conventions on traffic in women referred in its title to the “white
slave trade.”  The title demonstrates the difficulty faced in the 1920s in separat-
ing contemporary forms of slavery from historical forms. The experience of the
seventeenth to nineteenth centuries had fixed in the Western mind the idea
that slavery was an institution in which black people were owned as property.
(This is an idea, of course, which still has currency and resilience.) For that
reason, trafficking in women was given a racialized definition as the white
slave trade and relationships characterized by violent control and economic
exploitation but without benefit of legal ownership were termed “similar in-
stitutions and practices.” However, it is precisely these characteristics—vio-
lence, control, and economic exploitation—which are central to understanding
contemporary slavery.
Universal Declaration of 1948: Servitude Identified
Following the establishment of the UN, the General Assembly in 1948
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the “Universal Declara-
tion”), Article 4 of which states that “No one shall be held in slavery or servi-
tude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.”29  This
provision confirmed the international community’s opposition to “servitude”
and to all forms of slavery. The newly established UN also reviewed the exist-
ing League of Nations conventions to determine which might be continued
within the UN framework. In 1949, an Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Sla-
very stated that there was “not sufficient reason for discarding or amending
the definition contained in Article 1(1) of the Slavery Convention 1926.”30
This Committee did, however, point out that the definition in the Slavery Con-
vention of 1926 did not cover the full range of practices related to slavery and
that equally repugnant forms of servitude, such as the extensive forms of debt
bondage present in the Indian subcontinent, should be prohibited. It also stated
that a passive commitment to abolition was inadequate and that national au-
thorities should take “positive measures of international assistance in elimi-
nating the economic and social causes of slavery.”31  The Committee, therefore,
recommended that a supplementary convention be drafted to cover practices
analogous to slavery, including many of the practices outlined in the Slavery
Convention of 1926, such as serfdom, debt bondage, and forced labor.
Supplementary Convention of 1956: Servile Status Defined
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956 (the “Supplementary
Convention”) extended and broadened the definition of slavery put forward
in the 1926 Convention. The provisions of Article 1 oblige states to abolish
certain institutions and practices analogous to slavery which are referred to
collectively as “servile status.”32  These include:
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“(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising from a pledge by
a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as
security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not
applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those
services are not respectively limited and defined;
(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a tenant who is by law,
custom or agreement bound to live and labor on land belonging to another
person and to render some determinate service to such other person, whether
for reward or not, and is not free to change his status;
(c) Any institution or practice whereby:
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage
on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guard-
ian, family or any person or group; or
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer
her to another person for value received or otherwise; or
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by an-
other person;
(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of
18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guard-
ian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploita-
tion of the child or young person or of his labor.”
Article 1 of the Supplementary Convention consequently clarified that states
should seek “the complete abolition or abandonment” of the various forms of
slavery and slavery-like practices, “where they still exist and whether or not
they are covered by the definition of slavery contained in article 1 of the Sla-
very Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926.”
Sections (c) and (d) of the Supplementary Convention concern unfree forms
of marriage and child labor. These are indicative of two important themes in
the construction of definitions of slavery. First, they demonstrate the tendency
of international bodies to widen the definition of slavery as time passes. By
designating these as institutions which are analogous, or similar in certain
respects, to slavery, they opened the door to other relationships, situations,
and institutions being lumped together as “forms” of slavery. In time, these
would include phenomena as diverse as prostitution, incest, and the sale of
human organs. Second, with the inclusion of unfree forms of marriage and
child labor, and to a lesser extent debt bondage, a new area of ambiguity was
introduced. This ambiguity hinges on the concept of consent and the location
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of consent within cultural boundaries. This is best seen in section (d) on child
labor. Depending on how the word “exploitation” is defined, this could de-
scribe the apprenticeship of a 17-year-old to a skilled craftworker.
The Supplementary Convention of 1956 augments but does not replace the
definition of slavery in the Slavery Convention of 1926. Although there have
been concerns that slavery may need redefinition in the light of changing
social and economic conditions, the combined definition in these two con-
ventions has remained in place. The UN has made occasional restatements;
for example, in 1983 slavery was said to be “any form of dealing with hu-
man beings leading to the forced exploitation of their labor.”33  In spite of
those restatements or additions, the definition of slavery in the interna-
tional legal context has not essentially been altered since 1926, although
slavery has been repeatedly prohibited in numerous later international con-
ventions.
Covenants of 1966: Unfree Labor
It took nearly 20 years for the obligations set out in the Universal Declara-
tion to be given international legal effect by the introduction of two binding
covenants.34  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (the “Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant”) and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “Civil and Political Cov-
enant”) were adopted in 1966. The latter Covenant has been more widely
ratified than the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant and has a mecha-
nism whereby an individual whose rights have been violated can make a
claim directly to the Human Rights Committee in accordance with the Op-
tional Protocol.35
The two covenants contain provisions relating to slavery and its prohibi-
tion. Article 6 of the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant recognizes the
right to work “which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain
his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts.”36  Article 7 and 8 of this
Covenant set out certain conditions and rights that must be upheld and pro-
tected by governments, such as fair wages, equal pay for work of equal value,
and the right to form and join trade unions.
The 1966 Civil and Political Covenant directly prohibits slavery and servi-
tude in Article 8 in words similar to those of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. This provision comprises one of the inalienable rights (even in
times of public emergency) under the Covenant in accordance with Article
4(2), indicating the importance attached to the abolition of slavery. The only
difference from the terms of the Universal Declaration is that the prohibition
against servitude in the Civil and Political Covenant is set out in a separate
section.37  Article 8 also contains a provision, which prohibits the use of forced
labor subject to certain limited exceptions.38
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The International Bill of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration; the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant;
the Civil and Political Covenant; and the Optional Protocol to the Civil and
Political Covenant have together become known as the “International Bill of
Human Rights,” as they set out the fundamental human rights which must be
protected and upheld under international law. The International Bill of Hu-
man Rights does not contain definitions of slavery, servitude, or forced labor.
When applying these generally applicable provisions of the International Bill
of Human Rights, the international community would have to look to the defi-
nitions that exist in other international instruments.
The Rome Final Act: Trafficking
The most recent reference to slavery in an international instrument is in the
Rome Final Act39  (July 17, 1998), which established the International Criminal
Court. Enslavement is deemed a crime against humanity that falls under the
jurisdiction of the Court. It is defined as “the exercise of any or all of the pow-
ers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise
of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and
children.”40  This definition is largely the same as the first definition adopted
by the League of Nations over 60 years ago, with the addition of a specific
reference to trafficking.
Summarizing the Definitions Held in the Slavery Conventions
In Table 1 we list and summarize the definitions of slavery and slavery-like
practices as they appear in the international instruments since 1926.
The review in Table 1 of the main slavery conventions illustrates the way in
which views of slavery in international conventions evolved and became
confused over time. While in 1926 the notion that a person exercised rights
of ownership over another received the direct definition of slavery, the ex-
ample of forced labor from colonial settings was added as a practice that
could become analogous to slavery. In 1948 and 1956 the ideas and prac-
tices related to “servitude” and “servile status” were added. Both terms are
defined in The Oxford English Dictionary (1991) using the words “slave” or
“slavery.” However, international legislators consciously avoided defining
them in those terms. In 1966, the issue of unfree labor was addressed. By
1998, the definition of slavery had returned to its original 1926 version
with the addition of the practice of trafficking in persons. In the next sec-
tion, we examine the main characteristics of slavery in order to elucidate it
and provide the basis for the generation of our own definition of contempo-
rary slavery.
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Analyzing the Main Characteristics of Slavery in International Agreements
Defining Ownership and the Loss of Free Will
A common theme in all of the agreements concerning the abolition of sla-
very and slavery-like practices is the concept of ownership. The fundamental
characteristic of many of these practices is that they curtail freedom of move-
ment and ability to make decisions, as well as many other fundamental free-
Table 1
Summary of the Evolution of Slavery Conventions
Slavery Convention Definition/Declaration Regarding Slavery
Slavery Convention (1926) Slavery defined:
Is the “status or condition of a person over
whom all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership are exercised”
Forced Labor added:
States should “prevent compulsory or forced
labor from developing into conditions analogous
to slavery.”
Universal Declaration (1948) Servitude added:
“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude;
slavery and the slave trade should be abolished
in all their forms”
Supplementary Convention (1956) Servile Status added:
Practices referred to as servile status should be
abolished:
a) debt bondage
b) serfdom
c) unfree marriages
d) the exploitation of young people for their
labor
Economic, Social and Cultural Freedom to choose work added:
recognizes “the right of everyone to the
opportunity to gain his living by work which he
freely chooses or accepts.”
Rome Final Act (1998) Trafficking added:
Slavery defined as “the exercise of any or all of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership
over a person and includes the exercise of such
power in the course of trafficking in persons, in
particular women and children.”
28 Human Rights Review, January-March 2001
doms. That is, many of these practices deprive victims of the exercise of their
free will. It is understandable that the concept of ownership pursuant to which
the enslaved individual loses all control over his or her own life and labor was
considered a central issue in identifying slavery by the international commu-
nity.  The wording of the Slavery Convention of 1926 is ambiguous as to whether
this concept of control must be absolute in nature, whether the enslaved per-
son has totally lost the ability to exercise free will. It can be argued that the use
of the phrase “any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership”41
was intended to give a more expansive and comprehensive definition of slavery
which would include not just the forms of slavery involved in the African slave
trade but also many “slavery-like” practices. An international treaty must be in-
terpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning and in the light of its
object and purpose, taking into account, among other factors, relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.42  It is
clear that the aim of the Slavery Convention of 1926 was to eliminate all forms
of slavery, however they arose, given their severe and often irreversible effects
on individuals.
The concept of ownership has resulted in slaves sometimes being described
as “chattels.”  Traditional slavery is often referred to as “chattel slavery” because
the owners of such slaves had the right to treat slaves as possessions, like
livestock or furniture, and to sell or transfer them to others. Slavery as a form
of legal ownership of a person is extremely rare today. For that reason the
criterion of ownership may obscure some of the other characteristics of slavery,
which are associated with the complete control to which a victim of slavery is
subjected by another person, and which are implied by the Slavery Convention’s
wording: “any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership.”
It is clear that the nature of the relationship between the slaveholder and
the slave, as well as the conditions within which the slave is held, are crucial to
understanding and identifying what actually constitutes slavery. In this regard
there are certain elements that must be considered, including:
(a) whether or not an individual has freedom of movement and choice of work,
and, if not, what restrictions are placed on this freedom;
(b) whether or not an individual has control over his or her own productive capac-
ity and his or her personal belongings and wages;
(c) whether or not an individual has given informed consent and understands the
nature of the relationship between himself or herself and the other person(s) in-
volved.
The economic exploitation and loss of free will that are inherent in slavery
are often accomplished through the threat of violence and accompanied by
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ongoing abuse, and for that reason violence also becomes a key identifying
attribute of slavery. The bonded laborer whose family has been enslaved for
generations against a falsely accounted debt, the child kidnapped and locked
into a workshop, or the woman forced into prostitution have all lost the ele-
ment of choice and control of their lives. This loss is normally enforced, whether
the entity taking it is an individual or a state, through violence.
Defining Unfree Labor and Violence or the Threat of Violence
As the use of intimidation, coercion, or force is frequently cited as a reason
for categorizing particular forms of exploitation as slavery, the question of
whether economic imperatives—a need for money or income—constitute a
form of “force” is pertinent. The question is raised in various contexts, but chiefly
in relation to traffic in women and prostitution. Some argue that certain women
and men enter into prostitution voluntarily and should not therefore be cat-
egorized as victims of slavery. Others argue that the women and men con-
cerned only do so because of a lack of alternative sources of income, and that it is
these economic considerations, particularly institutionalized discrimination against
women, resulting in a lack of income-earning opportunities, which “force” them
to resort to prostitution. Evidently, this type of  “force” is very different from the
threats of physical violence by pimps or others to which many prostitutes are
subjected. Also difficult to categorize is the pressure of discrimination to which
women practicing prostitution (whether they have entered into prostitution
voluntarily or involuntarily) are subjected, and which keeps them from leav-
ing prostitution. Although such pressure is again of a different type from the
coercion that may have led them into prostitution in the first place, it is a very
real “force” which prevents them from changing their occupation.
It is not only in relation to prostitution that these questions are raised. For
example, some bonded laborers could potentially escape their bonded status
by leaving the community in which the person responsible for their bondage
(their employer) has influence. No physical forms of constraint or barriers pre-
vent them from leaving. Economic and social considerations, however, along
with a lack of awareness of what might happen to them and their families,
mean that they do not leave. Thus, slavery can be seen as a social phenom-
enon, an understanding of which could be facilitated by the application of
social scientific concepts and theories.
Slavery and Social Science
The Capitalist Mode of Production
Two types of social theory that can be useful in illuminating slavery are
those that deal with economic and cultural aspects of social relations. Eco-
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nomic explanations, both from a Marxist and neoclassical perspective, exam-
ine the development of capitalism in rural areas of the Third World, where
slavery is more prevalent, to argue that the process of developing a capitalist
mode of production is a process of liberation—liberation from the land and
liberation from an employer. The worker becomes free to sell his or her own
labor power as a commodity. Political transformations generally accompany
the creation of a working class with pressures for better wages and working
conditions. People who are enslaved are not free to sell their own labor power
as a commodity; they are economically exploited by their holders, and held
under conditions of violence. Slave labor as it is sometimes used in rural areas
in the developing world stalls the political transformations that generally ac-
company the proletarianization of the workforce and reimposes authority over
a workforce where a proletariat already exists.
Slave labor can perform the same role attributed to technology in the class
struggle, used by capital to cheapen or discipline free wage labor or to even
serve as a substitute for it. In precisely the situations where a political con-
sciousness begins to develop, capital can shift the balance of power by restrict-
ing labor mobility using slave labor.43  This can include importing enslaved
workers such as bonded laborers, or converting free workers into enslaved
workers. In this sense, the labor power of the enslaved person becomes the
property of the slaveholder. It is a commodity over which the slaveholder has
complete control. A free laborer can enter or withdraw from the labor market
at any time, but a slave cannot; he or she cannot sell his or her own labor
power and thereby commodify it. This is true whether the period of enslave-
ment is of a fixed or temporary duration or indefinite.44  This socio-economic
explanation of slavery can help to inform certain aspects of slavery as a social
relationship, but not other socio-cultural factors.
Slavery and Alienation
The slaveholder holds the labor power of the slave, but the slave is also
owned or controlled in a much more basic way by the slaveholder; the slave’s
own life is held by the slaveholder. This has led some to focus on the cultural
aspects of the social relationship of slavery. Orlando Patterson defines a slave’s
status as a form of “social death,” a term which encapsulates the radical way in
which the life of the slave is held. When a person becomes a slave, he says,
that person becomes “natally alienated”—that is, he/she effectively loses any
cultural, social, and personal history and future, and slave status is created or
socialized only in relationship to the slaveholder.45  This exists for as long as a
person is a slave, whether their enslavement lasts for a few weeks or a lifetime.
The idea of social death and natal alienation can be described with reference
to the situations of actual slaves. A Mauritanian slave has stated that: “My
master separated me from the father of my children and forbade us to marry;
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he cut me off from any contact with the world outside his house.”46  The en-
slavement of a person in the charcoal industry in Brazil has been described as
“from this moment the worker is dead as a citizen and born as a slave.”47
The concept of “social death” highlights the totality of the process of en-
slavement and the status of the slave, but it begs certain questions. The impact
of enslavement on the life of the slave shares certain characteristics with in-
mates of total institutions. Elie Wiesel,48  for example, discusses the re-social-
ization of inmates of Nazi concentration camps, the dissolution of their
personalities, the fading from memory of their previous lives, the invention of
a new being tailored to the demands and context of the camp. Like slavery,
this was a state marked by the loss of autonomy, a lack of free will, and subju-
gation to extreme and violent control. But could the inmates be said to truly be
socially “dead”?
Slavery is, after all, a social and economic relationship between two people.
It may be one marked by an extreme imbalance in power, by regular and on-
going exploitation, and by the potential for violence, but it remains a relation-
ship understood and recognized (if not agreed to) by both parties. From
historical instances of slavery come extensive accounts of the interdependence
of slaves and masters and of the sometimes rich and caring relationships that
grew up between them.49  In Mauritania in 1997, David Hecht found an Afro-
Mauritanian walking hand in hand with a White Moor dressed in matching
robes. They told him that they were master and slave as well as best friends.50
It may be that the concept of “social death” works best when “social life” is
defined as being in a state of autonomy and free will, but autonomy varies
enormously in human relationships. Slavery may occupy one end of the con-
tinuum, a relationship marked by the least amount of autonomy, but it re-
mains a social relationship.
There are two other factors that raise questions about the concept of “social
death.”  The first is the difference in psychological and social adjustments to
enslavement by people of different ages. One of the authors has interviewed a
number of slaves. Those who have been enslaved from a very early age often
show an acceptance of slavery and a willingness to define themselves in rela-
tion to their masters. They tend to have a clear idea of their location in the
social universe, as “belonging” to a certain family or individual slaveholder. Yet
that state holds within itself a social and personal history, one which slaves
will easily recount when asked. For example, this was the reply given by a
bonded laborer in India when he was asked how long his family had lived in
their village:
We have always lived here. I do not know about before my grandfather, but he said
we have always lived here. My grandfather was halvaha [a bonded ploughman] to
the landlord, and later my father was also his halvaha. They were both bonded by
debt, my father by his father’s debt, I don’t know about my grandfather’s debt. It’s a
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regular thing. Kohl people like us have always been bonded to Brahmins like my
master. That’s the way it has always been around here.51
People who are enslaved as adults, on the other hand, carry with them
memory of their former state. This memory often becomes the emblem of their
desire for freedom. Having known some form of freedom, they are unlikely to
accept a view of themselves as “socially dead,”  but to see themselves as abused,
coerced, and controlled against their will. Given these self-definitions, we would
assert that neither those enslaved as children nor those enslaved as adults
cease to be social beings.
The second factor that raises questions about “social death” concerns the
length of time a person is enslaved. Contemporary slavery is marked by tem-
porary enslavement. Given that a social life exists before and after the period
of enslavement, that family ties may be disrupted but are rarely lost or forgot-
ten, it is difficult to support a diagnosis of “natal alienation” in spite of Patterson’s
assertion that temporary slaves are equally  “socially dead.”  This form of “alien-
ation” might be characteristic of slavery as the complete legal ownership of
one person by another with the concomitant transformation of the slave into
portable property. But enslavement does not require ownership, only control,
usually achieved through violence or its threat. Slavery existed as a social and
economic relationship before it was legally defined and has continued after
the abolition of its legal state. Generating a universal definition of this rela-
tionship, one that is sufficiently dynamic to apply to a variety of historical and
geographical settings, is the challenge.
Defining Slavery
Building on our discussion of definitions of slavery in international agree-
ments and social scientific theory, we now propose to define slavery as a state
marked by the loss of free will where a person is forced through violence or the threat
of violence to give up the ability to sell freely his or her own labor power. In this
definition, slavery has three key dimensions: control by another person, the
appropriation of labor power, and the use or threat of violence. Applying this
definition to many practices, we can see that while a number of them have the
elements of slavery and are often defined as such, they do not have all three
aspects and therefore in our definition are not slavery. Table 2 identifies prac-
tices that have been officially defined in international agreements as forms of
slavery, and assesses them on the basis of the criteria of our definition.
The Three Dimensions of Slavery
Table 2 reviews the phenomena that previously have been termed slavery
and assesses them based on the three variables of our definition. In “white
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slavery,”  forced labor, debt bondage, child prostitution, forced prostitution,
and sexual slavery, all three aspects of our definition are present. The cases of
migrant workers, prostitution, and forced marriage can be manifested as sla-
very under certain conditions. Apartheid, incest, organ harvesting, migrant
workers, and caste have all been defined as slavery-like practices, but we would
not define them as slavery since the theft of labor power in particular does not
occur to the same degree when compared with the practices we have identi-
fied as consistent with slavery.
The case of prison labor is unique, because prisoners have had their free
will and labor power appropriated by the state for committing crimes. Prison
labor is a particularly thorny question, as the accusation of the enslavement is
primarily dependent on the legitimacy of the regime and the fairness of the
justice system that imprisons. When people are held against their will without
any form of due process and threatened or coerced with violence, and their
labor power is taken (all attributes of the current situation in Burma according
to the ILO), then it is reasonable to assess the imprisonment as a form of
Table 2
Practices Defined as Forms of Slavery in International Conventions
Practice/Criteria Loss of free will Appropriation of Violence or
√
 
 = Yes (√
 
/×) labor power threat of violence
×
 
 = No (√
 
/×) (√
 
/×)
“White Slavery” √ √ √
Forced Labor √ √ √
Debt Bondage √ √ √
Child Prostitution √ √ √
Forced Prostitution √ √ √
Sexual Slavery √ √ √
Migrant Workers √/× √/× √/×
Prostitution √/× √/× √/×
Forced Marriage √/× √/× √
Apartheid √/× × √
Incest √/× × √
Organ Harvesting √/× × √/×
Caste × × √
Prison Labor × √/× √
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state-sponsored slavery. When an inmate of a British prison is voluntarily en-
rolled in a work project for which he or she is remunerated, this can hardly be
described as slavery. The last column, violence or the threat of violence, can be
present in all the practices that have been labeled as slavery. This may explain
some of the confusion of the definitions of slavery in international agreements.
Furthermore, in defining slavery it is important to recognize that there may be
some instances where some or all of our three dimensions of slavery may exist
in practices we do not define as slavery. Our aim in this paper is to separate the
practices where all three dimensions of slavery are always present. These in-
clude examples such as debt bondage, forced prostitution, and sexual slavery.
Debt Bondage
In the 1956 Supplementary Convention, debt bondage is defined as the
“status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services
or those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of
those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of
the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited
and defined.”52  The 1956 Convention places debt bondage within the cat-
egory of practices likely to result in a “servile status”53  and obliges govern-
ments to pass laws to abolish it. One of the key areas of misunderstanding in
both international instruments and popular conception centers on the part of
the definition that reads “the value of those services...is not applied towards
the liquidation of the debt.”  The confusion arises because this definition ex-
plains that the labor power is not applied to the debt, but it does not explain
how that labor power is actually used within the lender-debtor relationship.
There are in fact two distinct forms of debt bondage, both meeting this
criterion but in different ways. In many cases of debt bondage the labor power
(and indeed the very life of the debtor) becomes collateral for the debt. This
establishes the trap of bondage; since all the labor power of the debtor is the
collateral property of the lender until the debt is repaid, the debtor is unable to
ever earn enough to repay the debt by his or her own labor. This arrangement
is a hallmark of the debt bondage of the Indian subcontinent. In other areas
the work of the debtor may ostensibly be applied to the debt, but through false
accounting or extortionate interest, repayment remains forever out of reach. In
the first form, the very nature of the agreement which transforms labor power
into collateral practically disqualifies the debtor from ever repaying the debt.
In the second form it is a violation of the agreement, when “the value of those
services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the
debt,” that traps the debtor.
The definition of debt bondage in the Supplementary Convention also high-
lights the important fact that the pledging of a person’s services to repay a
debt becomes abusive if the terms and conditions of such an arrangement are
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unregulated. This criterion distinguishes between an acceptable arrangement
whereby an individual is working to pay off a debt incurred and the enslave-
ment of debt bondage. In the former, it is legitimate for a worker to accept
credit for whatever reason and to repay this amount by working, so long as the
repayment terms are fixed and the capital sum borrowed is only subject to
reasonable interest rates. None of these safeguards exists in a debt bondage
situation. In 1924, the Temporary Slavery Commission pointed out that al-
though the contract is made with the consent of the debtor, “it often happens
that the creditor so arranges that his debtor gets more and more into debt,
with the result that what was in the beginning only one apparently equitable
contract is transformed finally into enslavement for life.”54  The bonded la-
borer is often at the mercy of his or her employer or creditor and the terms of
the loan or advance are either not stipulated or not followed.
The dominant position of the employer or creditor in such instances in-
creases the risk and opportunity of abuse, for example allowing the creditor to
adjust interest rates or simply to add interest without informing the bonded
laborer, imposing high charges for food or tools, and making additional ad-
vances on wages, resulting in increased debt. Ultimately, these conditions mean
that the debtor is unable to repay the loan and remains bonded for an indefi-
nite period, potentially throughout his or her life. In some instances, individu-
als are compelled to place a child or another member of the family in bondage
to repay a debt or to obtain a loan, as they are unable to complete all of the
work to be done. This situation perpetuates the cycle of debt from one genera-
tion to the next. The practice of placing a child or other family member in
bondage is sometimes identified as “pawning” or “pledging,” while the situa-
tion of families which remain in debt bondage from one generation to the
next is generally referred to as “chronic bondage.”
The evidence of debt bondage received by the Working Group on Contem-
porary Forms of Slavery has mainly concerned rural areas. Indeed, the prob-
lem of bonded labor is viewed internationally as “an economic malady”55  linked
to rural unemployment. The International Commission of Jurists Seminar on
“Rural Development and Human Rights in South Asia” held in India during
December 1982 concluded that “landless and bonded laborers are among the
weakest and most exploited sectors of the rural communities in South Asia.”56
Debt bondage is not exclusive to rural or agricultural laborers, however; it
also occurs in such industries as construction, quarrying, and brick making.
The debt which results in the enslavement of the victim can be incurred in
many different ways, notably including travel costs, subsistence, and housing,
or through the activities of a recruitment agency.57  The definition of debt bond-
age in the Supplementary Convention is sufficiently wide to cover many mi-
grant workers who either borrow money or unwittingly incur costs which
employers or agents subsequently tell them that they must repay. This pre-
dicament can affect both migrant workers who leave their own country to
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seek work abroad and workers who leave their community to seek work else-
where within their own country.
It has been observed that the connection between trafficking and forced
labor practices “is nowhere more clear than in the practice of debt-bondage.”58
The victims are enticed, procured, or kidnapped to their new workplace by the
agent or trafficker and must, on arrival, repay the travel and subsistence costs
incurred. Often women are pushed into prostitution in order to repay this
money. The threat of violence and their total dependence on the agent in the
new environment in many instances forces the worker into the sex industry.
Debt bondage or bonded labor today affects millions of adults and children
in their own countries and migrant workers throughout the world. It has been
suggested that one of the reasons why these practices continue is the eco-
nomic pressure to retain competitive export prices.59  As a result, bonded labor
systems continue to exist quite openly in many developing countries despite
legislation prohibiting them. They also flourish more clandestinely in indus-
trialized countries, affecting migrant workers in general and illegal migrants
in particular. These cases are consistent with the Marxist analysis of the role of
unfree labor in the process of capitalist development discussed earlier.
In view of the prevalence of bonded labor among the landless in rural areas,
governments may in some instances have to reform the existing land tenure
systems in order to comply with their obligations under the Supplementary
Convention to prevent debt bondage. The UN’s Food and Agricultural Orga-
nization (FAO) has for many years been assisting in the reform of feudal and
semi-feudal structures of land tenure and the abolition of debt bondage through
the development of credit institutions.
Although the practice of debt bondage has in the past been associated mostly
with landless laborers, it is now an international phenomenon affecting many
migrant workers. The marked increase in international travel for employment
opportunities and in the number of refugees has increased the risk of migrant
workers being forced to work to repay an agency fee of an undetermined
amount, i.e. becoming victims of debt bondage.
Forced or Enforced Prostitution
The treaties introduced in the first half of the twentieth century do not refer
explicitly to the term “forced prostitution,” but they did refer explicitly to the
use of violence and threats. For example, the 1910 White Slavery Convention
made it a crime for “any person who, to gratify the passions of others, has by
fraud or by the use of violence, threats, abuse of authority, or any other means
of constraint, hired, abducted or enticed a woman...for immoral purpose.”60
The use of some form of coercion or force was anticipated, whereas later trea-
ties, including the Suppression of Traffic Convention, are not confined to forced
prostitution.
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This transition reflects the change in attitudes towards prostitution, a mat-
ter that has remained polarized in recent times. On the one hand, there are
those who believe that there can never be such thing as consensual prostitu-
tion and that the exploitation of individuals through prostitution in all its forms
should be eliminated and the perpetrators punished.61  On the other is the
view that only coerced or non-consensual prostitution should be controlled
and prevented by international standards and the criminal law.62  Advocates of
the first view argue that all prostitution is forced, pointing out that women are
“forced” to become prostitutes because of lack of money or other financial
pressures.63  In so doing, they are attributing an inclusive meaning to the term
“forced” in relation to threats of violence, intimidation, or coercion linked to
other forms of slavery—although it is clear that a lack of alternative sources of
income does constitute a form of coercion, especially when the lack of alterna-
tives for certain individuals is due to society-wide constraints imposed upon
women.
Forced prostitution is usually defined as a person (normally a woman) be-
ing coerced through violence or intimidation to engage in sexual acts in return
for money or some other payment. It was proposed by the Council of Europe
that forced prostitution be defined as the “act, for financial gain, of inducing a
person by any form of constraint to supply sexual services to another per-
son.”64  Constraint would include the more obvious forms of violence, such as
beatings, rape, torture, and threats. It was suggested, however, that “any form
of constraint” should be interpreted more widely to include the act of obtain-
ing sexual services from a person “by taking advantage of his/her vulnerability
resulting either from his/her precarious or illegal situation, or of his/her posi-
tion of economic dependence.”65
As in our definition of slavery, prostitutes are controlled by various methods
to ensure their acquiescence. It is this loss of free will brought about through
violence and intimidation that places forced prostitution clearly within our
definition of slavery as well as the definitions in the UN slavery conven-
tions, including the Suppression of Traffic Convention. Forced prostitution
has been described by one intergovernmental organization as “the owner-
ship of women and children by pimps, brothel owners and sometimes even
customers for the purpose of financial gain, sexual gratification and/or power
and domination.”66
There has been a great deal of interest by legal writers and scholars in the
concept of forced prostitution and in particular, the element of control held by
pimps over prostitutes. It has been claimed by one such commentator that:
Pimps control prostitutes through: (1) physical abuse; (2) physical control of pros-
titutes’ children; with threats to keep the children as hostages if prostitutes leave;
(3) serious threats of physical harm, including murder; (4) keeping prostitutes in a
continuous state of poverty and indebtedness; and (5)ensuring that they have no
freedom to move outside unaccompanied.67
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An individual is deemed to be a pimp if he or she “draws another into pros-
titution and thereafter dictates the daily activities, supervises the manner of
operation...expropriates and spends virtually all earnings and otherwise com-
mands influence over that person’s life.”68  In fact, in certain circumstances the
control may be so complete “that he will have little difficulty actually selling
his ‘possession’ to another pimp.”69  Since the end of the Cold War there has
been a dramatic increase in illegal migration, and these migrants are espe-
cially vulnerable to this kind of enslavement. Those involved in smuggling
illegal migrants will take control by retaining passports, using violence, and
convincing the victim that they have even more to fear from law enforcement
authorities in the destination country. In combination, these tactics lead to the
power needed to subject someone to forced prostitution.
It is clear that all of the key elements necessary for a practice to fall within
the slavery definition are present in forced prostitution. In the United States,
for example, it has been pointed out that “forced prostitution like slavery im-
plicates all of the core concerns of the Thirteenth Amendment—physical abuse,
lack of free will, forced labor and social stratification.”70  Forced prostitution
can therefore be deemed a form of slavery for the purposes of the prohibition
against slavery in the U.S. Constitution. It also falls under the definition of
slavery, servitude, and forced labor as set out at the international level. The
observer for the Commission on the Status of Women acknowledged this prin-
ciple as early as 1978, when he told the Sub-Commission that the Commis-
sion considered forced prostitution to be a form of slavery.71
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of Violence Against Women in 1993 to increase the coverage already
provided in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women. In this Declaration, Article 2 provides that violence against
women shall be understood to include “trafficking in women and forced pros-
titution.”72  This reference to “forced” in relation to prostitution in the Declara-
tion on the Elimination of Violence Against Women is exceptional in UN
standards. In international humanitarian law, however, the prohibition has
always been against combatants resorting to force, with a consistent reference
to enforced prostitution, rather than simply to prostitution per se.
International humanitarian law is the law of armed conflict, both interna-
tional and internal. The laws relating to armed conflict were codified after World
War II in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.73  These Conventions deal
with the treatment of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field, at sea,
and the treatment of prisoners. The Fourth Geneva Convention deals with the
protection of civilian persons in time of war.74  According to this convention,
“Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in
particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault”75
(emphasis added). It is unclear whether the use of the term “enforced prostitu-
tion” in this instance can be distinguished in any way from “forced prostitu-
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tion,” although this difference in terminology has persisted in international
humanitarian law documents. In Additional Protocol I (to the Geneva Con-
ventions relating to the victims of armed conflict), for example, Article 75 lists
fundamental prohibitions, one of which outlaws “outrages of personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and
any form of indecent assault.”76
Sexual Slavery
The concept of sexual slavery is less clearly defined than forced prostitution.
It is normally treated as a separate and distinct form of sexual exploitation,
with the implication that there does not have to be any direct financial gain in
sexual slavery. Since the slave is forced to provide a service that has economic
value, it might be seen to represent the theft of the labor power of the en-
slaved, but it is better conceptualized as an extended form of rape. Sexual sla-
very involves the absolute control or power of one person over another. It is
the sexual exploitation of individuals through the use or threat of force, some-
times occurring in times of war, armed conflict, or belligerent occupation, which
clearly places it under the rubric of rape. Sexual slavery violates the funda-
mental guarantees of basic human rights in the International Bill of Human
Rights.
Kathleen Barry has suggested that sexual slavery occurs in a very wide set of
conditions, suggesting that female “Sexual slavery is present in all situations
where women or girls cannot change the immediate conditions of their exist-
ence; where regardless of how they got into those conditions they cannot get
out; and where they are subject to sexual violence and exploitation.”77  In this
definition, the key element of this form of slavery is the complete control over
the victim. This concept of sexual slavery has been recognized by some na-
tional courts. In the United States, a clear example was the United States v
Sanga.78  In that case a man forced a woman to work as a domestic maid for
over two years and forced her to have sex with him. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 9th Circuit unanimously held that she was a “virtual slave” contrary to
the provision of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.
The use of sexual slavery in any form during times of armed conflict—rape
camps such as those seen in the conflict in the Balkans, “comfort stations” as
established by the Japanese in the Second World War, or other forms of sexual
abuse—constitutes a grave breach of international law and human rights.
Armed conflict increases sexual violence against women, and the UN has in-
stituted specific protective and punitive measures. A study prepared for sub-
mission to the World Congress on the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of
Children held in Stockholm in August 1996 highlighted the link between the
violence of war and the sexual exploitation of women and children. Either or
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both parties to a conflict may use this violence against women and girls as part
of a more general tactic of intimidation.
Although the fundamental basis of the laws of war has not changed, namely
the balance between military necessity and humanity, human rights law has
become more relevant during armed conflicts. This principle was first recog-
nized in the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran in 1968,
which confirmed that “peace is the underlying condition for the full obser-
vance of human rights and war is their negation.”79  Humanitarian law is there-
fore seen as an effective method of protecting non-combatants from the
consequences of war.
The Geneva Conventions prohibit all parties in a conflict from perpetrating
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treat-
ment.”80  “Sexual slavery” is not specifically mentioned, but this provision in
Common Article 3 has been interpreted to include this type of violation.81  In
addition, Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which deals with “grave
breaches,” prohibits “torture or inhuman treatment...wilfully causing great suf-
fering or serious injury to body or health.”82  There is no immunity under inter-
national law for “grave breaches” of the convention. Additional Protocol I and
II both contain prohibitions against any form of indecent assault, especially of
women and children.
International humanitarian law has acknowledged the vulnerable position
of women and children to abuse in times of war and has attempted to redress
this problem. While this is not a new problem, “sexual slavery” is a recent addi-
tion to the issues considered in international documents. The UN has dis-
cussed sexual slavery in research and reports about abuses in modern warfare.83
For example, in the final report by the Sub-Commission’s Special Rapporteur
on Sexual Slavery in Times of War, she points out that detaining women in
“rape camps or comfort stations; forced temporary ‘marriages’ to soldiers are
both in fact and law forms of slavery contrary to the international standards.”84
In response to the Secretary-General’s Report on the abuse of women in the
Former Yugoslavia, the General Assembly “strongly condemned the abhorrent
practice of rape and abuse of women and children in the area of armed conflict
in the former Yugoslavia and reaffirmed that rape in the conduct of armed
conflict constituted a war crime.”85
As has been shown, both forced (or enforced) prostitution and “sexual sla-
very” have been repeatedly named as slavery. By our definition as well, virtu-
ally all forms of these two phenomena can be thought of as slavery. It is not
enough to say that prostitution represents a special case because it may exist
on a continuum from consensual to forced prostitution; many forms of debt
bondage also exist along such a continuum. Given this fact, the question arises
of why these two particular forms of slavery were picked out for differentia-
tion. We would argue that this differentiation has occurred for two reasons,
one historical and negative, one contemporary and positive. Historically, we
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believe that there has been a reluctance to deal with prostitution within the
legal discourse on slavery. The willingness to define most prostitution as con-
sensual, the stigmatization of prostitutes, and the marked ambivalence of (pri-
marily male-directed) law enforcement towards prostitution led to its separation
from “real” slavery and its toleration in many countries. Past instruments, such
as the 1910 White Slavery Convention, were attempts to establish a line be-
tween unacceptable forms of forced prostitution (especially of white women)
and those forms of prostitution that the framers considered normal, accept-
able, or inevitable.
More recent and more positive is the position, exemplified by the World
Congress on the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in 1996, that
forced prostitution is a special case within slavery because its effects on the
slave have certain key differences. One key difference is what might be thought
of as the transferability of skills. The enslaved agricultural worker can, upon
liberation, apply his or her skills as an independent farmer given the right
opportunity. This, in fact, is very often the case when modern bonded laborers
are freed. However, the enslaved prostitute who is freed is extremely unlikely
to want to remain a prostitute (though some feel pressed to do so given the
stigma attached to prostitution in many cultures). Secondly, it could be argued
that the rehabilitation needs of enslaved prostitutes are generally more pro-
found than that of other freed slaves. All slavery can be a harrowing and trau-
matizing experience, but the repeated sexual violation amounting to rape that
characterizes forced prostitution brings tremendous psychological damage and
requires intensive rebuilding of self-esteem and self-worth.
Our assertion then is this: that forced prostitution and sexual slavery be
firmly located as forms of slavery and not be devalued or obfuscated by virtue
of the sexual or gendered nature of the exploitation, and further, that these
forms of slavery be recognized as needing special consideration. Regrettably,
there is no developed field of study or practice that concerns the rehabilitation
of freed slaves. But different kinds of slaves need different kinds of rehabilita-
tion upon liberation; children, the sexually brutalized, and the tortured are
needful of special care. As the refinement of international instruments and
national laws continue, the definition of slavery in all its forms needs to be
linked to a recognition of the rehabilitation needs of freed slaves.
Conclusion
No international agreement has been completely effective in reducing sla-
very. This stems in part from the evolution of slavery agreements and the incli-
nation on the part of the authors of conventions to include other practices as
part of the slavery definition, resulting in a confusion of the practices and defi-
nitions of slavery. What has been missing is a classification that is dynamic
and yet sufficiently universal to identify slavery no matter how it evolves. We
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have attempted to build on theories and examples to clarify the identification
of slavery by focusing on an irreducible core of three elements. Assessing the
presence of all three can then be applied to a variety of social relationships:
first, the complete control of one person by another; second, appropriation of
labor power; and third, the enforcement of these conditions by threats or acts
of violence. Many practices identified in international agreements have some
but not all of these three aspects; all three are present in traditional forms of
slavery, bonded labor, forced prostitution, and sexual slavery. Effective research
and legislation against slavery is important, as it affects an estimated 27 mil-
lion people worldwide, and as slavery is on the increase now that many devel-
oping countries are forced to compete for income in a global economy.86  Finally
it is important to remember that slavery, like all social and economic relation-
ships, evolves over time. Any definition that is based on a historical form of
slavery will soon lose its power to capture new forms of slavery within its
aegis. Our understanding and our definition of slavery must become as dy-
namic as the phenomenon itself.
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